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Abstract
This paper proposes a simple analytical method to determine the stationarity of an unnormalized
variable from the solution to a normalized model i.e. a model whose variables must be expressed
in relative terms or must be differenced for a solution to exist. The paper then applies the method
to answer a question of interest to policy-makers: does optimal policy under commitment lead to
stationarity in the price level? Unlike Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2007), the paper ﬁnds that
optimal policy under commitment does not lead to price level stationarity in the Smets and
Wouters (2003) model.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, E58
Bank classiﬁcation: Monetary policy framework
Résumé
L’auteur propose une méthode analytique simple pour déterminer la stationnarité d’une variable
non normalisée à partir de la solution d’un modèle normalisé – c’est-à-dire un modèle dont on a
exprimé les variables en termes relatifs ou sous la forme de différences aﬁn de pouvoir le
résoudre. Il se sert de cette méthode pour répondre à une question importante pour les autorités
monétaires : l’application d’une politique monétaire optimale permet-elle d’atteindre la
stationnarité du niveau des prix? Contrairement à Gaspar, Smets et Vestin (2007), l’auteur conclut
que la politique optimale ne conduit pas à la stationnarité du niveau des prix dans le modèle de
Smets et Wouters (2003).
Classiﬁcation JEL : E52, E58
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Cadre de politique monétaire1. Introduction
Economists use dynamic models to analyze a variety of economic problems. Since they
are typically interested in stationary solutions to their model, the model must be freed
from unit roots for such a solution to exist ( Blanchard and Khan 1980). Therefore, the
model is normalized i.e. variables are expressed in relative terms or di®erenced prior to
solving. However, for some purposes, it is important to determine the properties of the
unnormalized variables. For instance, while models in the monetary policy literature are
often cast in terms of the in°ation rate, the policy-maker may want to know about the
stationarity properties of the price level.
This paper proposes a simple analytical method to determine the stationarity of an
unnormalized variable e.g. a level variable from the solution to a normalized model. Our
approach is based on the mathematical de¯nition of an impulse response. The basic intuition
is the following: if a variable is stationary, temporary shocks must not have permanent e®ects
on that variable. Our method uses the solution to the normalized model and the relationship
between the normalized and unnormalized variable to derive a formula for the impulse
response of the unnormalized variable to a temporary shock. It is easy to calculate and
further, in the case of non-stationarity, it o®ers the added bene¯t of determining which shock,
though temporary, has permanent e®ects on the unnormalized variable. By construction,
the formula also calculates the magnitude of those permanent e®ects.
The paper then uses the formula to answer a question of interest to policy-makers: does
optimal policy under commitment lead to stationarity in the price level. Woodford (2003)
shows that price-level stationarity would indeed be a feature of optimal policy in a basic
NKPC model. In fact, he derives the result assuming a quadratic loss function in in°ation
and the output gap. Therefore, even though the objective of monetary policy is not to
stabilize the price level per se, price level stationarity still results. He however argues that
that result was likely to be special to the basic NKPC model. He argues, for instance,
that if the policy-maker also cared about stabilizing changes in the interest rate in his loss
function, price level stationarity would not result.
Recently, Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2007), argued that price-level stationarity could
still be a feature of optimal policy even in much more intricate models. Assuming a model
with many more frictions than the basic NKPC (Smets and Wouters 2003) and a policy-
maker that also cares about stabilizing interest rate changes in addition to in°ation and
output gap, they argue that the price level is stationary. Indeed, they produce ¯gures of
1impulse responses of the price level to a temporary cost-push shock and argue that the e®ect
of the shock eventually disappears.
In this paper, we revisit their analysis using our formula. We ¯nd that the price level is
in fact not stationary: temporary shocks have permanent e®ects ( although small) on the
price level. Hence as remarked by Woodford (2003), price level stationarity is a feature of
optimal policy under commitment only in special circumstances.
That result has implications for the in°ation targeting versus price level targeting de-
bate. Indeed, in view of its 2011 \renewal of the in°ation control target" meetings with
the Government of Canada, the Bank of Canada is currently seriously investigating the
bene¯ts and costs of switching from in°ation targeting (which does not lead to price level
stationarity) to price level targeting (which induces price level stationarity). What our re-
sult implies for that debate is that a switch to price level targeting should not be justi¯ed
on the basis that optimal policy under commitment also leads to price level stationarity.1
That conclusion is fragile and may not hold for more realistic models than the NKPC (e.g.
Smets and Wouters 2003).
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 derives the formula for determining station-
arity, section 3 applies the formula to determine stationarity in three di®erent models, and
section 4 concludes.
2. Determining stationarity of an unnormalized vari-
able













subject to a linear forward-looking model
H1zyyt + H1zzzt¡1 + H2zzzt + H3zzEtzt+1 + Bzit = 0
H1yyyt + H1yzzt¡1 + H2yyyt+1 + Cy²t+1 = 0 (2)
1Using an OLG model with aggregate uncertainty and nominal bonds, Kryvtsov, Shukayev, and Ueber-
feldt (2007) ¯nd that optimal policy does not require price level stationarity. Optimal policy exhibits price
level (and in°ation) targeting but not price level stationarity.
2where it is the policy-maker's policy instrument, zt are endogenous state variables that are to
be determined within the model once the policy-maker sets his instrument at time t, yt+1 are
state variables over which the policy-maker has no control other than through the in°uence
of past predetermined zt¡1 and ²t+1 are the innovations of yt+1 for which Et(²t+1) = 0 and
Et(²t+1²0
t+1) = ­.
First-order conditions to the above problem give rise to a di®erence equation in the





, and the associated co-state variables, ¹t (see
appendix A). Therefore, solving for optimal policy involves solving the di®erence equation.
The solution is known to exist under certain conditions ( see Hansen and Sargent 2004,
Blanchard and Khan 1980, Anderson and Moore 1985). Those conditions typically imply
that the model is written in relative terms or rates rather than levels. For example, if
the objective of the policy-maker is to control in°ation, the model will be formulated such
that Xt includes the in°ation rate, ¼t, rather than the price level pt. If those conditions are
satis¯ed, the optimal policy for it under commitment will be a function of the predetermined
state and co-state variables at time t (see appendix A) i.e.
it = FXXt¡1 + F¹¹t¡1; (3)











and the transition matrix N has stable eigenvalues.
In a stationary system, the e®ect of a temporary shock must eventually disappear. This











Hence if N has stable eigenvalues, the e®ect of a temporary shock that hits at time t0
eventually disappears as ¿ tends to in¯nity.
But suppose that we were interested in the impulse response of the level of a variable.
3To be more concrete, suppose that Xt is expressed in terms of the in°ation rate, ¼t but we
are interested in the impulse response to the price level, pt. We use the following approach
to determine the stationarity of the price level: ¯rst, let h be a selection vector that picks
out ¼t from Zt such that ¼t = hZt. Then, since pt = pt¡1 + ¼t,

















Therefore the e®ect of a temporary shock that hits at time t0 on the price level can be














= h(I ¡ N)
¡1C (9)
= 0: (10)
The last result will be our basis for determining whether the price level is stationary. Letting
r1 = h(I ¡ N)
¡1C; (11)
given the matrices N and C that characterize the evolution of the economy in (A9), we will
compute r1 and verify whether it yields a row of zeros. If it does, then that will imply
that the e®ect of any shock on the price level eventually disappears i.e. the price level is
stationary. If it does not, then some (or all) shocks have permanent e®ects on the price
level.
43. Price level stationarity
3.1 The simple NKPC model
To illustrate how my approach works, I use as benchmark the simple NKPC in Woodford
(2003). The model of the economy is
¼t ¡ °¼t¡1 = ¯(Et¼t+1 ¡ °¼t) + ·xt + ut (12)
where ¼t is the in°ation rate, xt is the output gap, 0 · ° · 1 is the degree of indexation,
and ut is an exogenous cost-push shock following an AR(1) process
ut+1 = ½uut + ²
u
t+1: (13)











The above problem is a control problem that can be mapped into the typical linear-quadratic
control problem de¯ned in section 2. In fact, for the simple NKPC model, an analytical
solution can even be obtained. It can be shown that under the full commitment solution,

























, and ¹t¡1 is
the co-state variable associated to the forward-looking variable.














































Letting N denote the transition matrix in (16), it is easy to show that the eigenvalues of
N are respectively ½u;°; and 1
'2. Thus if the degree of indexation,°, is less than 1, the
eigenvalues of N are all stable.
5Woodford (2003) shows that even though the loss function of policy-maker does not
penalize variability in the absolute level of prices, the price level is stationary except when
there is perfect indexation i.e. ° = 1. Given the evolution of the economy, (16), how can
this be veri¯ed? Should we, for instance, use the identity linking the price level to in°ation,
Pt = Pt¡1+¼t to expand the system and determine stationarity of the resulting state vector
X0
t = [ut+1;¼t;¹t;Pt]? The answer is no: introducing the price level through the identity
would automatically introduce a unit root in the system and hence invalidate the typical
methods we use to determine stationarity of the expanded state vector (Hamilton 1994).
To determine stationarity of the price level, we can instead verify whether temporary
shocks have temporary e®ects using (9).





Table 1 shows how r1 varies with ° = 0;0:5 and 1. It con¯rms Woodford (2003)'s analysis.
The e®ect of cost-push shock on the price level dies out for 0 · ° < 1 but leads to a
permanent increase in the price level for ° = 1 ( r1 = 49:12). Why does this happen?
Figure 1 which shows the impulse responses of in°ation, output gap and price level
conveys the intuition. Consider the ° = 0 case, for instance. Since the policy-maker can
control the output gap directly ( the output gap is the instrument of the policy-maker in this
example), following the unexpected in°ationary cost-push shock, the policy-maker spreads
the e®ect of the shock by reducing output below potential today but returning it to potential
only gradually. Since rational forward-looking agents can anticipate this, the expectation of
output being below potential for a while leads to expectations of lower prices for tomorrow.
Hence, through the NKPC, (12), this also implies that the price increases today will be
smaller than otherwise. As ¯gure 1 illustrates, the fact that output is returned to potential
gradually coupled with the smaller contemporaneous increase in prices means that in°ation
eventually undershoots its long run level (the ° = 0 curve drops below 0 after 2 quarters);
the unexpected increase in prices is undone and the price-level becomes stationary.
Notice how a price level targeting regime would operate similar to the full-commitment

























Figure 1: Impulse responses under di®erent degrees of indexation
7solution above. Indeed, under a price level targeting regime, in response to the unexpected
increase in prices due to the cost-push shock, since agents expect the price level to eventually
go back to target, they expect lower in°ation for tomorrow. The lower expectations of
in°ation for tomorrow, through (12), imply that the policy-maker does not need to adjust the
output gap by as much as he would have had to do had those expectations been una®ected.
Hence output can be returned to potential gradually just as the full-commitment solution
prescribes.
When ° = 1, the loss function (14) implies that the policy-maker is concerned with sta-
bilizing the change in in°ation rather than the in°ation rate. In that case, no undershooting
occurs. In°ation is gradually returned to its long run level after the cost-push shock. But
since the shock is not undone, the price-level is non-stationary.
3.2 The NKPC and the IS curve
I now consider the case where the policy-maker's model consists of two equations: (i) the
NKPC, (12), (ii) the IS curve
xt = Etxt+1 ¡ ¾(it ¡ Et¼t+1 ¡ r
n
t ) (17)
which relates the output gap to the nominal interest rate, expected in°ation and the natural
rate of interest, rn








Since the policy-maker cannot directly control the output gap, the policy instrument of the









t + º(it ¡ it¡1)
2ª
: (19)
In section 3.1, we showed that an important reason for price level stationarity was the fact
that policy-maker had complete control on the output gap. In response to the temporary
cost-push shock, the policy-maker could adjust the output gap gradually to undo the increase
in prices following the shock. In the present case, since º 6= 0, the policy-maker does not
have the luxury to move xt as desired without caring about it. Therefore, owing to the
policy-maker's preferences, there may be limits to how much the interest rate (and hence
output gap) can adjust in response to shocks. Table 2 con¯rms that intuition. In addition




0 0 0 0
0 0.5 -0.004 -0.53
0 1 -0.006 -0.69
0.5 0 0 0
0.5 0.5 -0.12 -0.29
0.5 1 -0.17 -0.39
1 0 0 0
1 0.5 -0.17 -0.48
1 1 -0.24 -0.66
to the degree of indexation being less than one, price level stationarity requires that º, the
weight that the policy-maker assigns to controlling changes in the interest rate, is zero.
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses to a natural rate shock and the cost-push shock
when the degree of indexation is 0.5 and the weights to output gap and interest rate stabi-
lization are both 0.5. Consider the natural rate shock. On impact, it leads to a fall in prices
and an increase in the output gap. The policy-maker adjusts the interest rate but that
adjustment never leads in°ation to overshoot its long run level. Hence the initial impact of
the shock is not undone; there is a permanent decline in the price level.
3.3 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2007) argue that optimal commitment policy induces price level
stationarity in the Smets and Wouters (2003) model. Smets and Wouters (2003) is a much
more elaborate model than the basic NKPC. It features three types of economic agents:
households, ¯rms and the central bank. Households decide how much to consume, how
much to invest and how much to work and at what wage. Firms employ workers and capital
and decide how much to produce and at what price to sell their products. In addition to
a number of real frictions such as habit formation in consumption and adjustment costs in
investment, the model features nominal price and wage rigidities. Thus, there are a number
of frictions which make it costly to revert the price level. Yet, when analyzing the e®ect of
a price mark-up shock, for instance, Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2007) point out that \...in
spite of the other real and nominal frictions, optimal commitment policy again induces a











































































Figure 2: Impulse responses to natural rate and cost-push shock for the case ! = º = ° = 0:5
































































Figure 3: Impulse responses to price mark-up shock
stationary price level." (section 2.3, paragraph 2).
This section uses our method to verify that conclusion. As in Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin
(2007), I assume a policy-maker that minimizes a quadratic loss function in the variability
of the semi-di®erence of in°ation, output gap and interest rate change with weights 0.9,
0.1 and 0.05 respectively under commitment. Figure 3 displays the impulse response of
in°ation, output gap, interest rate, wage, and price level to a 1 per cent price mark-up
shock. The last panel shows that after leading to an increase in the price level of 5 per cent
after 5 quarters, the e®ect of the price mark-up shock eventually diminishes. But is the
shock to the price level fully reversed?
Table 3 reports the e®ect on the price level of a temporary 1 per cent shock. The rows
of the ¯rst column displays the shock considered and the corresponding row in the second
column reports r1. What the table tells us therefore is that the price level is not stationary.
Each of the temporary shock lead to a permanent, albeit small, shift in the price level.
Hence, what appears as price level stationarity in the last panel of ¯gure 3 in fact is not.










The e®ect of the shock diminishes over time but is never completely eliminated.
4. Conclusion
This paper proposes a simple analytical method to determine the stationarity of an unnor-
malized variable from the solution to a normalized model i.e. a model whose variables must
be expressed in relative terms or must be di®erenced for a solution to exist. We use the
solution to the normalized model to derive an explicit formula for the impulse response of
the unnormalized variable to a temporary shock. Stationarity can then be determined by
verifying whether a temporary shock has a temporary e®ect on the unnormalized variable.
The paper then applies the method to answer a question of interest to policy-makers:
does optimal policy under commitment lead to stationarity in the price level? We use
the formula to determine whether optimal policy under commitment leads to price level
stationarity in three models: (i) the simple NKPC model in Woodford (2003), (ii) the
NKPC model and an IS curve, and (iii) Smets and Wouters (2003). The paper ¯rst con¯rms
Woodford's conclusion that optimal policy under commitment in the simple NKPC model
policy leads to price level stationarity unless there is full indexation. Secondly, it con¯rms
Woodford's intuition that the price level is in general not stationary if the policy-maker
cares about stabilizing changes in the interest rate in the loss function. However, contrary
to Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2007), the paper ¯nds that the price level is non-stationary
in Smets and Wouters (2003): temporary shocks have permanent e®ects ( albeit small) on
the price level.
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13Appendix A: Full commitment solution











subject to the model
H1Xt¡1 + H2Xt + H3Xt+1 + Bit = 0: (A2)
Notice that since the loss function (A1) is quadratic and the model linear, I can solve the
non-stochastic version of the policy-maker's problem owing to certainty equivalence.











t (H1Xt¡1 + H2Xt + H3Xt+1 + Bit)g: (A3)
The ¯rst-order conditions are
it : it = ¡R
¡1B
0¹t (A4)







¡1¹t¡1 = 0: (A5)
By substituting the f.o.c.'s for it into the constraint (A2), we obtain
H1Xt¡1 + H2Xt + H3Xt+1 ¡ BR
¡1B
0¹t = 0: (A6)













































14It can be shown that given the transversality conditions and appropriate initial conditions











The matrix N can be solved for using invariant subspace methods (e.g. Dennis 2003) or

























I will write the full commitment solution as it = FXXt¡1 + F¹¹t¡1.
A.1 Dynamics in a stochastic system
In this section I consider the problem recast as a stochastic system. Beginning with
H1Xt¡1 + H2Xt + H3Xt+1 + Bit + C²t+1 = 0; (A12)






















²t+1 = 0: (A13)

















15Appendix B: Smets and Wouters (2003)
I include below the equations of Smets and Wouters (2003) and the calibration of the
parameters in table B. I used Uhlig (2006) version and calibration of Smets and Wouters
(2003).
The capital accumulation equation:
^ Kt = (1 ¡ ¿) ^ Kt¡1 + ¿ ^ It¡1 (B1)
The labour demand equation:
^ Lt = ¡ ^ wt + (1 + Ã)^ r
k
t + ^ Kt¡1 (B2)
The goods market equilibrium condition:




^ Yt = Á²
a
t + Á® ^ Kt¡1 + Á®Ã^ r
k
t + Á(1 ¡ ®)^ Lt (B4)
The monetary policy reaction function, a Taylor-type rule:
^ Rt = ½ ^ Rt¡1 + (1 ¡ ½)
½




+r¢¼(^ ¼t ¡ ^ ¼t¡1) + r¢Y
µ
^ Yt ¡ ^ Y
P





where ^ Y P
t refers to a hypothetical "frictionless economy" and potential output. The
16di®erence ^ Y t ¡ ^ Y P








Et ^ Ct+1 ¡
1 ¡ h
(1 + h)¾c





















^ Qt = ¡( ^ Rt ¡ Et^ ¼t+1) +
1 ¡ ¿
1 ¡ ¿ + ¹ rkEt ^ Qt+1 +
¹ rk




























¯ 0:99 Discount factor
¿ 0:025 Depreciation rate of capital
® 0:3 Capital output ratio
Ã 1
0:169 Inverse elasticity of capital utility cost
°p 0:469 Degree of partial indexation of price
°w 0:763 Degree of partial indexation of wage
¸w 0:5 Mark-up in wage setting
»p
s 0:908 Calvo price stickiness
»w
s 0:737 Calvo wage stickiness
¾L 2:4 Inverse elasticity of labour supply
¾c 1:353 Coe±cient of relative risk aversion
h 0:573 Habit portion of past consumption
Á 1:408 1 plus share of ¯xed costs in production
' 1
6:771 Inverse of inventory adjustment cost
¹ rk
1
¯ ¡ 1 + ¿ Steady-state return on capital
ky 8:8 Capital-output ratio
invy 0:22 Investment share in GDP
cy 0:6 Consumption share in GDP
ky
invy
¿ Capital income share
gy 1 ¡ cy ¡ invy Government expenditure share in GDP;
r¢¼ 0:14 In°ation growth coe±cient
ry 0:099 Output gap coe±cient
r¢Y 0:159 Output gap growth coe±cient






























^ wt ¡ ¾L^ Lt ¡
¾c
1 ¡ h







18Table B2: Calibration, continued
Parameter Value Description
½ 0:961 AR for lagged interest rate
½²L 0:889 AR for labour supply shock
½²a 0:823 AR for productivity shock
½²b 0:855 AR for preference shock
½G 0:949 AR for government expenditure shock
½¹ ¼ 0:924 AR for in°ation objective shock
½²i 0:927 AR for investment shock
½²r 0 AR for interest rate shock, IID
½¸w 0 AR for wage markup, IID
½q 0 AR for return on equity, IID
½¸q 0 AR for price mark-up shock, IID
¾²L 3:52 Standard deviation of labour supply shock
¾²a 0:598 Standard deviation of productivity shock
¾²b 0:336 Standard deviation of preference shock
¾G 0:325 Standard deviation of government expenditure shock
¾¹ ¼ 0:017 Standard deviation of in°ation objective shock
¾²r 0:081 Standard deviation of interest rate shock
¾²i 0:085 Standard deviation of investment shock
¾¸p 0:16 Standard deviation of mark-up shock
¾¸w 0:289 Standard deviation of wage mark-up shock
¾²q 0:604 Standard deviation of equity premium shock.
19